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of rents; this, in turn, has implications for the effects of corruption on welfare.
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This paper analyzes the impact of conventional trade policy instruments
such as tariﬀs and quotas in a simple competitive model of supply with
heterogeneous traders facing ﬁxed costs and capacity constraints. Traders in
our model are import distributors or agents who bring products and services
from another country into their home country for distribution and resale.
The role of traders–middlemen who buy and sell a product but neither
produce nor consume it themselves–has been largely ignored in the interna-
tional trade literature. Yet in practice, traders play a key role in international
commerce because potential buyers (home consumers) and sellers (producers
from the rest of the world) usually cannot meet directly and conduct trades.
In other words, traders are necessary to facilitate trade. In return, they make
their money by buying low and selling at what the market will bear. A re-
cent Washington Post article (Timberg, 2006) described the activities of an
African importer thus: “He strapped $5,000 to his waist and ﬂew oﬀ to Asia
in search of a new kind of fortune, built not on making goods but trading
them... He met with Chinese businessmen in Singapore and quickly spent
t h e$ 5 , 0 0 0h eb r o u g h ta n d$ 1 5 , 0 0 0m o r eh eh a dk e p ti nr e s e r v ei nN i g e r i a .I n
return, he got four used Honda cars and one and a half shipping containers
full of car parts. [He] calculates that he can sell the cars and auto parts
for $34,000, a proﬁt of 70 percent on his investment.” But trading is neither
costless nor riskless–as with any business venture, trading involves setup
costs and ﬁnancial risks.1 These considerations play an important part in
the behavior of traders.
In our model, imports are supplied by such proﬁt-maximizing competitive
traders. There is free entry into (and exit from) the import industry: anyone
can become a trader by paying a ﬁxed cost which allows him to buy a good
from the world market at a random price and to sell it in the integrated
domestic market at the market-clearing price. In practice, such ﬁxed costs
typically involve, at the minimum, the cost of registering and setting up an
import business. The traders face capacity constraints, so no one trader can
dominate the market and there is perfect competition. This setup reﬂects
reasonably well trade in various types manufactured products where import
and export are mostly carried out by small businesses; it does not apply to
other goods such as primary commodities where an integrated world market
1Examples of risks include unexpected ﬂuctuations in prices and delivery times.
2exists, and highly specialized products with a limited number of buyers and
sellers. The model is used to understand what happens when traders get
only a part of what their eﬀorts obtain. This could be because there are
t r a d ep o l i c e si np l a c el i k et a r i ﬀs or quotas, or because corruption transfers
rents and/or raises costs, both ﬁxed and variable. In this manner, our work
contributes to the literature on tariﬀs( b o t hs p e c i ﬁc and ad valorem) versus
quotas in international trade as well as that on corruption and licensing.2
Our model can be seen as a competitive analogue of the monopolisti-
cally competitive heterogeneous ﬁrm setting common in the international
trade/industrial organization literature. In those models, it is relatively com-
plicated to obtain insights into the eﬀects of trade policy; see for example,
Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), and Baldwin and Forslid (2006). Furthermore,
those models focus primarily on export behavior. In contrast, we focus on
importers. By looking at heterogeneous traders in the absence of complica-
tions caused by product diﬀerentiation and monopolistic competition, we are
able to obtain clean results and shed some light on the pure eﬀect of cost
heterogeneity and ﬁxed costs on the impact of trade policy in the long term
(when entry/exit can occur) versus the short term (when entry/exit cannot
occur).
Why is it important to model the role of traders explicitly? We do so
not simply to inject a dose of realism into the analysis but because the size
of the import industry matters for the amount of trade that takes place and
the consequent level of social welfare. And the size of the import industry, in
turn, is aﬀected by the costs and risks involved in importing. This is where
our model diﬀers from the standard partial equilibrium analysis of trade
policy under perfect competition: by explicitly introducing entry costs and
an element of uncertainty for all potential traders–factors that are crucial
in determining the entry decisions of traders and ultimately, the outcome of
trade policies–we show that neglecting the role of traders can lead one astray
in evaluating the eﬀects of various trade restrictions. Thus, the fundamental
contribution of this paper lies in its implications for trade policy, which diﬀer
quite substantially from the norm.
There is an enormous literature on the ranking of “equivalent” policies in
trade. The classic paper in a competitive setting is McCulloch (1973) which
argues that equivalence needs to be carefully deﬁned: import equivalent po-
lices may be ranked one way while domestic consumption equivalent ones
2For a survey of some of the older literature in this area, see Krishna (1990).
3may be ranked in the opposite manner. In another classic paper, Bhagwati
(1965) shows that market structure matters: while tariﬀsa n dq u o t a sm a yb e
equivalent under competition, they are not under monopoly. Since then, this
work has been extended to a variety of settings including oligopoly, uncer-
tainty, and so on.3 However, there has been no analysis of how such policies
aﬀect the size of the import industry (via entry) in a competitive setting, and
what this means for welfare. We show that when heterogeneous traders and
entry costs are introduced into the picture, quotas diﬀer substantially from
tariﬀsv i at h e i re n t r ye ﬀects. The standard equivalence results no longer hold
and the conventional ranking of tariﬀsa n dq u o t a sc a nb et u r n e do ni t sh e a d :
quotas are not as bad for welfare as previously believed, while tariﬀsm a y
restrict trade by more than originally intended.
Our model also provides a new insight into the eﬀect of corruption. The
conventional wisdom is that corruption cannot be good for social welfare: to
the extent that it results in a pure transfer of rents from one set of agents
to another, it is at best neutral to aggregate welfare (though of course, not
to the distribution of welfare), but to the extent that anticipated corruption
discourages investment, it can be harmful to welfare. In contrast, we show
that there are circumstances in which corruption can actually improve social
welfare. When there is an import quota in place, the way in which the
quota licenses are distributed matters a great deal. We show that entry is
(constrained) optimal if importers have to pay for the quota licenses but
not if they are given the licenses for free according to some rationing rule,
therefore welfare is higher whenever the quota rent is captured by some
domestic agent(s) other than the traders themselves.4 This suggests that
society as a whole will be better oﬀ if the quota licenses were “sold” by
corrupt customs oﬃcials through bribery than if the quota licenses were
given away to traders by a benevolent government. The way in which quotas
are allocated thus aﬀects aggregate welfare, and not just its allocation across
agents.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3
characterizes the free trade equilibrium with endogenous entry of traders,
3More recently, Jørgensen and Schröder (2005) compare ad valorem and speciﬁct a r i ﬀs
in terms of welfare in monopolistically competitive models using the standard CES utility
function introduced by Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz.
4Whether the quota rents are captured by the government or by corrupt domestic
agents does not matter for aggregate welfare, only for its distribution across domestic
agents.
4and shows that this equilibrium is socially optimal. Section 4 looks at what
happens when trade is restricted by a quota set below the free trade level of
imports. For a given quota, entry will adjust (down) to the socially optimal
level but of course, the smaller the quota, the lower the welfare. We also
consider the eﬀects of selling the quota rights (by the government or through
bribery) versus giving them to the traders, and show that the former welfare
dominates the latter: the allocation of property rights aﬀects market out-
comes, and corruption can actually have beneﬁcial welfare eﬀects. Sections
5 and 6 consider, respectively, a speciﬁct a r i ﬀ a n da na dv a l o r e mt a r i ﬀ that
generate the same initial level of imports as the quota. A speciﬁct a r i ﬀ results
in greater exit of traders and lower welfare than does a quota. An initially
import equivalent ad valorem tariﬀ reduces entry and welfare even more than
does an initially import equivalent speciﬁct a r i ﬀ. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
Assume there is an integrated domestic market for a particular good where
a single price, P, prevails. Demand in this market is given by QD (P).F o r
simplicity, assume the good is not produced at home.5 Domestic consumers
cannot directly access the world supply of this good. Instead, they are served
by traders who import the good from the world market and sell it domesti-
cally. This world market is not integrated in the sense that there is no single
price that prevails: rather, there is a distribution of prices denoted by F (c)
which this small country takes as given.6
Suppose there is a continuum of these traders with mass N.E v e r yt r a d e r
has a ﬁxed entry cost, fe, that he has to incur to enter the market. Once this
is paid, the trader gets a draw from the known distribution of prices F (c).
5We can also interpret QD (P) as domestic excess demand as long as domestic entry is
ﬁxed, for the positive part of the analysis.
6There are several ways to think about this. We can just assume a price distribution in
the world market without specifying where it comes from (which is what we do here). Or
we can assume that the traders do not know their productivity (or costs) prior to entry.
After entry, each trader draws a productivity, and hence a cost–he is then able to import
one unit at the world price plus his costs. High productivity traders would thus be willing
to supply at a lower price. Finally, we can think of c as inversely related to quality, which
is variable and cannot be contracted upon in the world market. So there could be a single
price in the world market per “eﬀective” unit, but proﬁt in the domestic market is variable
due to diﬀerences in quality.
5In other words, paying the entry cost allows a trader to access the world
market at a random price and to sell in the domestic market at the domestic
market-clearing price. There are limits to the scale at which the traders can
operate as each trader has limited resources at his disposal. For simplicity,
assume that each trader has the capacity to import one unit.7
The setup is as follows. First, the trader decides whether to enter the
market or not. If he enters, he is matched with a seller in the world market
and gets a draw of c from F (c). Depending on the draw, the trader decides
whether to buy the good or not, keeping in mind that he receives no direct
utility from the good, only the proﬁt from selling the good domestically at
the market clearing price. If the domestic price is P, only those traders who
draw a cost of c ≤ P will choose to import the good. Thus, supply from a
unit mass of traders is F (P). As usual, the mass of traders in equilibrium
is determined so that their expected proﬁta tt h et i m eo fe n t r yi sz e r o . I n
what follows, we work with a static setting.8
3 Equilibrium Under Free Trade
Under free trade, if a mass of N traders enters the market, supply will be
equal to NF (P), and the free trade market clearing price, PF (N), will be












Note that PF (N) is decreasing in N: the price of the import falls as more
traders enter the market. The free trade situation is illustrated in Figure
1, which shows a downward sloping demand curve PD (Q) and an upward
sloping supply curve PS (Q,N) drawn for a mass of N traders.
Consider a trader deciding whether to enter the market or not. If he
e n t e r sa n dd r a w sac o s tb e l o wt h em a r k e tc l e a r i n gp r i c e ,h ew i l le a r nq u a s i
rent equal to the diﬀerence between the two, i.e., PF (N) − c;i fh ed r a w sa
7Capacity constraints of some sort are necessary for internal consistency of a model
with cost heterogeneity and perfect competition.
8It is easy to convert this into its dynamic analogue in steady state (à la Melitz (2003))
by assuming a constant exogenous death rate for all ﬁrms, and setting the mass of entrants
in each time period to exactly compensate for these deaths. We choose not to do more
than note this in the interests of simplicity.













































cost greater than or equal to PF (N), he will not import and his quasi rent













(where the second equality follows from integration by parts). Total quasi
rent earned in the economy, NrF (N), is equal to the area between the supply
curve and the equilibrium price, that is, the area OAB in Figure 1. Since
PF (N) is decreasing in N, rF (N) must also be decreasing in N.
Entry will occur until each trader’s expected quasi rent equals the ﬁxed
cost of entry. Hence, the equilibrium level of entry under free trade (which








F (c)dc = fe. (3)












Assumption 1 fe <
¯ P R
0
F (c)dc where ¯ P is the price at which demand be-
comes zero.
If Assumption 1 holds, there is a unique free entry equilibrium with NF >
0.9 An increase in the entry cost fe will reduce the equilibrium mass of traders
NF.
Let us now turn to the welfare implications of our model. We know that
in the case of homogeneous goods and market power (Mankiw and Whinston,
1986) there is too much entry due to the “business stealing eﬀect”: ﬁrms do
not internalize the fact that their entry dissipates the proﬁts of other ﬁrms
and as a result, more of them enter the market than is socially optimal.
On the other hand, in the case of diﬀerentiated products and monopolistic
competition (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) there may be too much entry or too
little entry relative to the social optimum. Is entry optimal in the case of
competitive heterogeneous traders?
For any N, welfare is the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus
9In Figure 2,s i n c erF (N) is decreasing in N, the intersection of rF (N) and fe will
occur at NF > 0 only if fe lies below the vertical intercept of rF (N).









F (c)dc − Nfe. (4)
Proposition 1 The free trade equilibrium results in a level of entry that is
socially optimal, i.e., dWF (N)/dN =0at N = NF.
Proof. In the Appendix.
4 Restricted Trade: Quotas
Suppose that we are at the free trade equilibrium with NF traders in the
market when a binding quota of ¯ Q is imposed, where ¯ Q is less than the free
trade level of imports. Traders now have to purchase a quota license from
the government in order to sell the imported good in the domestic market.
What happens to entry?
The equilibrium is easy to depict in a picture, as is done in Figure 3.T h e
price in the domestic market (the demand price) is such that QD (P)= ¯ Q;c a l l
this PD ¡ ¯ Q
¢





,i se q u a lt ot h ed i ﬀerence between the demand price PD ¡ ¯ Q
¢
,a n d
the supply price PS ¡
N, ¯ Q
¢
, where the latter is given by setting supply equal







= ¯ Q. (5)
Note that PS ¡
N, ¯ Q
¢





, equals the distance DF in Figure 3.









as long as the quota is binding. Like PS ¡
N, ¯ Q
¢
, rQ(N, ¯ Q) is decreasing in
N and increasing in ¯ Q. The area OCD in Figure 3 corresponds to the quasi
rent earned by all traders who enter, so rQ(N, ¯ Q) is equal to (1/N) of the
area OCD.



































































level of N where the supply curve intersects demand at PD ¡ ¯ Q
¢
. This in-
verse supply curve is depicted in Figure 3.S i n c e¯ Q is less than the free
trade level of imports, N0
¡ ¯ Q
¢
must be below NF.O n c eN falls to N0
¡ ¯ Q
¢
and below, the quota will no longer be binding. Therefore, for a given
¯ Q, rQ ¡
N, ¯ Q
¢
















. This is depicted in Figure 4.
Equilibrium entry under the quota, which we will denote by NQ¡ ¯ Q
¢
, is




PS(NQ( ¯ Q), ¯ Q) Z
0
F (c)dc = fe. (7)
Note that NQ¡ ¯ Q
¢




and shifts the curve rQ(N, ¯ Q) downwards in Figure 4.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium supply price is invariant with respect to ¯ Q.I n
other words, PS ¡
























11Proof. This follows from comparing the free entry conditions under free
trade and under the quota (Equations (3) and (7). Since the expected quasi








and be independent of ¯ Q.
Proposition 2 If we start at the free trade equilibrium and impose a binding
quota, there will be a net exit of traders over time and the new equilibrium will
be characterized by a lower level of entry compared with free trade. Average
cost will ﬁrst fall and then rise (average productivity will ﬁrst rise and then
f a l l )a st r a d e r sﬁrst change their import and then their entry decisions in
response to the quota. Once entry adjusts, in the new equilibrium, average
cost (productivity) will return to its free trade level. The price of a quota
license will fall over time as the number of traders shrinks, but it will remain
positive in the new equilibrium.
Proof. We can think of the free trade equilibrium as equivalent to a quota
set at the free trade level of imports with a mass of NF traders. Thus the
impact eﬀect of imposing a binding quota (i.e., reducing the quota from QF
to ¯ Q) will be to make it unproﬁtable for incumbent traders who have cost









. This will lower average cost; in other words, maintaining our
analogy with the monopolistically competitive heterogeneous ﬁrm setting, it





Over time, there will be a net exit of traders from the market.10 In the
new equilibrium, the mass of traders, NQ¡ ¯ Q
¢
, is smaller than that under free
trade: since rQ ¡
N, ¯ Q
¢
lies below rF (N) when N>N 0
¡ ¯ Q
¢
, it must intersect
fe at a point between N0
¡ ¯ Q
¢
and NF.A s N adjusts down from NF to
its new equilibrium NQ ¡ ¯ Q
¢
, the supply price (i.e., the cost of the marginal
trader) will rise and average cost will also rise (or average productivity will
fall). As the supply price rises, the license price falls.
In the new equilibrium, the supply price returns to PF ¡
NF¢
, so average
cost and productivity return to their free trade levels: this follows from
Lemma 1. Hence, entry will always adjust to completely oﬀset the reduction
in the supply price caused by the binding quota. The equilibrium license
10In Figure 3,t h ea r e aOAB represents free trade proﬁts while the area OCD represents
total quasi rent under the quota ¯ Q.A tN = NF, it is clear that the quasi rent of OCD is
not enough to cover entry costs–recall that
¡
1/N F¢
of the area OAB is equal to fe,a n d
OAB > OCD. Thus, traders will exit.
12price, L
¡










Thus, our model provides some stark but interesting and potentially
testable predictions for the path of cost/productivity in an industry in re-
sponse to a quantitative restriction. In Section 4.2, we show that this depends
on the way in which the quota rights are distributed.
4.1 Welfare Under a Quota
L e tu sa s s u m et h a tt h eq u o t ar i g h t sa r es o l da n dt h a tt h e s er e v e n u e sg ot o
the government. For any N and ¯ Q, welfare is the sum of consumer surplus,





















¢¤ ¯ Q − Nfe. (8)
Lemma 2 The level of entry is socially optimal, given the quota level.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Note that in equilibrium, total quasi rent exactly equals total entry costs



















Q ¡ ¯ Q
¢
, ¯ Q)
¤ ¯ Q. (9)
Lemma 3 An increase in the quota always raises welfare.
Proof. In the Appendix.
4.2 Allocation of Quota Rent
We have assumed so far that quota licenses are sold, with the revenues ac-
cruing to the government. But this is often not the case; it is quite common
for quota licenses to be awarded to some or all importers based on certain
criteria such as past import performance. In this section, we show that the
13allocation of quota rent has an impact on the entry decision of traders. This
means that the details of quota implementation–who receives the licenses
and under what conditions–aﬀect not just the distribution of the rents, but
the equilibrium size of the import industry.
To illustrate, let us consider the scenario where quota licenses are not
sold but rather awarded to the traders free of charge. To avoid confusion, we
will refer to such an arrangement as “free” quota to distinguish it from the
previous case where traders had to pay for the quota licenses.
For concreteness, assume that quota licenses are tradeable. When a trader
c h o o s e st oe n t e r ,h ep a y st h eﬁx e dc o s t ,a n du p o nd o i n gs o ,h ei sa l l o c a t e da
license. This allocation is certain if the mass of traders that enter does not
exceed the quota, but occurs with a probability ¯ Q/N if N>¯ Q. Traders need
not import to get a license, they just need to enter (e.g., obtain a business
registration number). Since license markets work without friction, we can
assume that every trader that enters sells his license for L(N, ¯ Q) and then




denote the expected quasi rent per trader under the “free”
quota.11 If N ≤ N0( ¯ Q), then L(N, ¯ Q)=0 , PS ¡
N, ¯ Q
¢
= PF (N),a n d
rq(N, ¯ Q)=rF(N)–in other words, the quota is not binding. But if N>




> 0 and PS ¡
N, ¯ Q
¢








=1 , thus, entrants are not assured of a license. As
a result, they obtain
¡ ¯ Q/N
¢
L(N, ¯ Q) in expected terms from selling any li-
censes they are given and
PS(N,¯ Q) R
0
F (c)dc from their productive (importing)
activities. More compactly, expected earnings of an entrant are:
r










Clearly, rq(N, ¯ Q) >r Q(N, ¯ Q) for any N and ¯ Q, as long as the value of
the quota license is positive (i.e., when N>N 0( ¯ Q))–in other words, when
N>N 0( ¯ Q), entrants must make more in expected terms at any given N and
¯ Q than when they have to buy licenses.





14Lemma 4 For N>N 0( ¯ Q),r q ¡
N, ¯ Q
¢
is decreasing in N, and decreasing in
¯ Q if the quota is close to the free trade level of imports, but increasing in ¯ Q
if the quota is relatively restrictive.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Equilibrium entry under the “free” quota, which we will denote by Nq ¡ ¯ Q
¢
,




Proposition 3 Giving the quota licenses to traders results in more entry
and lower average cost (higher average productivity) compared to selling the
quota licenses to traders. If the quota is not too restrictive, giving the licenses
to traders can even raise entry above the free trade level. However, entry is
sub-optimally high given the quota level and equilibrium welfare is lower when
quota licenses are given away than when they are sold.
Proof. If we start at the free trade equilibrium and impose a binding “free”




the previous case; this will lower average cost (or raise average productivity).




but unlike the previous case, this amount
is part of the trader’s proﬁt.
O v e rt i m e ,t h e r ec o u l db ean e te x i to rn e te n t r yo ft r a d e r si nt h em a r k e t :
if the quota is restrictive, expected quasi rent per trader falls on impact
(when N = NF) and there will be net exit, but if the quota is not very
restrictive, expected quasi rent per trader rises on impact and there will be
net entry (from Lemma 4). If there is net exit, the supply price will rise
(average productivity will fall) as N falls; if there is net entry, the supply
price will fall further (average productivity will rise further) as N increases.
In the new equilibrium, the mass of traders will be Nq ¡ ¯ Q
¢
, where Nq ¡ ¯ Q
¢
is greater than NQ ¡ ¯ Q
¢
and possibly greater than NF. In Figure 4,t h e
quasi rent curves, rQ ¡
N, ¯ Q
¢













. It follows, therefore, that there is
greater entry when licenses are given to traders than when they are sold, i.e.,
Nq ¡ ¯ Q
¢
>N Q¡ ¯ Q
¢
.
In fact, it is possible for equilibrium entry under the “free” quota to
exceed NF, the equilibrium entry level under free trade. When the quota
is close to the free trade level of imports, rq ¡
N, ¯ Q
¢
is decreasing in ¯ Q,s o
12Note that Nq ¡ ¯ Q
¢
is decreasing in ¯ Q i ft h eq u o t ai sc l o s et ot h ef r e et r a d el e v e lo f




>r F (N),a sd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e4. 13 As a result, more traders
will be encouraged to enter the market. Thus, when the quota is not too
restrictive and the quota rights are given to the traders, the equilibrium level
of entry would be higher than under free trade, i.e., Nq ¡ ¯ Q
¢
>N F.
Since entry is greater when the quota rents are given to traders, the “free”
quota must remain binding in equilibrium, and the equilibrium supply price
must be lower compared to the previous case when the quota licenses were
sold: PS ¡












cost is also lower (average productivity is higher) than in the previous case.
Turning to welfare, note that Wq ¡ ¯ Q,N
¢
, like WQ ¡ ¯ Q,N
¢
,i st h es u mo f
consumer surplus, producer surplus, and license rents, less entry costs, for
any N and ¯ Q. W ek n o wf r o mL e m m a2t h a tg i v e n ¯ Q,e n t r yi so p t i m a lw h e n
the quota licenses are sold. Since Nq ¡ ¯ Q
¢
>N Q ¡ ¯ Q
¢
, it follows that given ¯ Q,
there is excessive entry under the “free” quota. In the free entry equilibrium,
when all quasi rents are competed away, welfare is made up solely of consumer
surplus:
W
q ¡ ¯ Q,N







It is clear from Equations (9) and (11) that welfare is lower with the “free”
quota. The reason is that license rents are not frittered away in excessive
entry when traders have to pay for their quota licenses, but are so frittered
away when they do not.
Proposition 3 demonstrates that the common practice by many govern-
ments of devising rationing rules to distribute quota licenses leads to inferior
welfare outcomes compared to simply selling the licenses outright.14
13In Figure 3, under free trade, total quasi rent is equal to the area of the producer
surplus triangle OAB when N = NF. When a “free” quota is imposed at N = NF, total
quasi rent is equal to the area of the producer surplus triangle plus license revenue, i.e.,
area OGFD. If the quota is not too restrictive (i.e., if the quota is close to the free trade
level of imports), OGFD must be larger than OAB because the increase in quasi rent from
the license revenue (rectangle DFGC) must exceed the decrease (triangle DFB): when
the quota is close to the free trade level of imports, the area of triangle DFB approaches
zero because its height (HB) and base (DF) approach zero, but the area of rectangle
DFGC does not approach zero as fast since FGdoes not approach zero, though DF does.
14Note that this is diﬀerent from the question of allowing quota licenses to be traded.
Even if trade is allowed, entry will be distorted by not selling the quota to begin with.
16Proposition 3 has a further interesting implication: welfare is higher when
quota rents are not appropriated by the traders but accrue to some other do-
mestic agent(s). If quota rents are captured by the traders (under a “free”
quota), there will be too much entry for a given quota and consequently
lower welfare, but if quota rents are captured by some other domestic agent,
then entry is optimal, given the quota, and welfare is higher. In the previous
case, we assumed that it was the government that sold the quota licenses
and thereby captured the quota rent, but it could just as well be corrupt
customs oﬃcials that “sell” the quota licenses through bribery. Whether the
quota rents are captured by the government or by corrupt oﬃcials does not
matter for aggregate welfare, only for its distribution across domestic agents;
as long as the quota rents go to domestic agents other than the traders, ag-
gregate welfare will be higher than under a “free” quota. This implies that
society will actually be better oﬀ if the quota licenses are “sold” via bribery
and corruption than if they were given away to the traders by a benevolent
government. Thus, we have uncovered another channel through which cor-
ruption can have real eﬀects, rather than simply distributional eﬀects; in this
example, the real eﬀects are actually welfare enhancing.
We will now compare the equilibrium eﬀects of “equivalent” trade policies,
that is, trade policies that generate the same level of imports as the quota
¯ Q with the free trade mass of traders, NF. This focuses attention on import
equivalence abstracting from entry, which is a likely starting point for policy
makers who typically lack the information necessary to predict the induced
entry eﬀects of diﬀerent trade policies.15
5 Restricted Trade: SpeciﬁcT a r i ﬀs
Let us start again from the free trade equilibrium with a mass of NF traders,
and consider now a speciﬁct a r i ﬀ that will reduce imports to the level of the
quota, ¯ Q,a sd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e3. This is the sort of scenario that a policy
maker is likely to consider in choosing between a quota and a tariﬀ to restrict
imports by a certain amount. The speciﬁct a r i ﬀ is thus initially import
equivalent to the quota, and equal to the quota license price at N = NF:
z(N
F, ¯ Q)=L(N
F, ¯ Q). (12)
15Our results generalize to policies that are equivalent given any number of traders in
the market, not necessarily the free trade number of traders. This is shown in Section 5.2.
17For notational simplicity, let us denote z(NF, ¯ Q) by ¯ z.I n F i g u r e 3,t h i s
is equivalent to shifting the supply curve up by L(NF, ¯ Q), or the distance
DF.P r e - t a r i ﬀ supply is NF(P) and post-tariﬀ supply is NF (P − ¯ z). The
post-tariﬀ supply curve has a vertical intercept at E where the distance OE
equals DF. The intersection of demand and post-tariﬀ supply determines












Note that PD (N,¯ z) is decreasing in N and increasing in ¯ z. The marginal
trader receives the supply price, PS (N,¯ z)=PD (N,¯ z) − ¯ z where PS (N,¯ z)
is decreasing in both arguments.16






Since PS (N,¯ z) is decreasing in both arguments, rz(N,¯ z) is also decreas-
ing in both arguments.
Lemma 5 rz(N,¯ z) lies below rQ(N, ¯ Q) for N<N F and above rQ(N, ¯ Q) for
N>N F.
Proof. At N = NF,t h es p e c i ﬁct a r i ﬀ is equivalent to the quota so ¯ z =













As N falls below NF, the quota license price falls but the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ




rz (N,¯ z) <r Q ¡
N, ¯ Q
¢
for N<N F. By an analogous argument it can be




Equilibrium entry under the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ, which we will denote by Nz (¯ z),
is determined by the intersection of rz(N,¯ z) and fe.N o t et h a tNz (¯ z) is de-
creasing in ¯ z. Furthermore, it follows from the same argument as Lemma 1
that the equilibrium supply price is the same as the free trade price, that is:
PS (Nz (¯ z), ¯ z)=PF ¡
NF¢
.





PS (N,¯ z)+¯ z
¢
and partially diﬀerentiating it with respect to N and ¯ z. For any given N, an increase in ¯ z
drives a bigger wedge between demand and supply, so the price of the marginal supplier
must fall.
18Proposition 4 If we start at the free trade equilibrium and impose a speciﬁc
tariﬀ that is initially import equivalent to the quota, there will be a net exit
of traders over time and the new equilibrium will be characterized by a lower
level of entry compared with the quota. Average cost will ﬁrst fall and then
rise (average productivity will ﬁrst rise and then fall) as traders change their
import and entry decisions in response to the tariﬀ. Imports will fall over
time as the number of traders shrinks. In the new equilibrium, average cost
(productivity) will return to its free trade level, and imports will be lower than
the quota level.
Proof. If we start at the free trade equilibrium and impose a speciﬁct a r i ﬀ
¯ z, t h ei m p a c te ﬀect will be to make it unproﬁtable for incumbent traders





to import. As in the
case of the quota when traders have to pay for the licenses, the supply price
drops to PS ¡
NF, ¯ z
¢
,which is equal to PS ¡
NF, ¯ Q
¢
. Hence average cost falls
(average productivity rises).
Over time, there will be a net exit of traders from the market. Since quasi
rent under the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ is equal to that under the quota at N = NF
( f r o mL e m m a5 ) ,u s i n gt h es a m el o g i ca sb e f o r e( w h e nt h eq u o t al i c e n s e sw e r e
sold), it follows that quasi rent per trader, rz ¡
NF, ¯ z
¢
is less than the entry
cost. Hence, there will be a net exit of traders. As N falls, the supply price
rises: in Figure 3,b o t ht h ep r e - t a r i ﬀ and post-tariﬀ supply curves will steepen
but remain parallel to each other and anchored at O and E respectively.
In the new equilibrium, the mass of traders is smaller than that under




which determines the equilibrium mass of traders, Nz (¯ z), must occur below
NQ¡ ¯ Q
¢
as depicted in Figure 4. Hence, Nz (¯ z) <N Q¡ ¯ Q
¢
<N q ¡ ¯ Q
¢
and
ﬁnal imports under the initially import equivalent tariﬀ will be less than
the quota. In the new equilibrium, the supply price returns to PF ¡
NF¢
,
so average cost and productivity return to their free trade levels: entry will
always adjust to completely oﬀset the reduction in the supply price caused
by the tariﬀ.
195.1 Welfare Under a SpeciﬁcT a r i ﬀ
For any N and ¯ z, welfare is the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus,
















Lemma 6 Welfare is decreasing in ¯ z for a given N,i . e . ,∂Wz (N,¯ z)/∂¯ z<
0. Welfare is increasing in N for a given ¯ z,i . e . ,∂Wz (N,¯ z)/∂N > 0, for
N ≤ Nz (¯ z);in other words, the level of entry is sub-optimally low, given the
speciﬁct a r i ﬀ.
Proof. In the Appendix.
In equilibrium (when N = Nz (¯ z)), all quasi rents are competed away so
welfare consists of consumer surplus plus tariﬀ revenue only:
W
z (N








z (¯ z), ¯ z)
¢
(16)
Lemma 7 Ar e d u c t i o ni nt h es p e c i ﬁct a r i ﬀ always raises welfare.
Proof. In the Appendix.
5.2 SpeciﬁcT a r i ﬀs, Quotas, and Equivalence
So far we have used the free trade equilibrium with NF t r a d e r sa so u rs t a r t i n g
point for analyzing the eﬀects of “equivalent” policies. But in practice, the
starting point for policy analysis need not be the free trade equilibrium: if
there are trade policies already in place, the number of traders in the market
could be greater or less than the free trade number. To see how the diﬀerent
notions of equivalence aﬀect our results, it is useful to look at Figure 5.T h i s
has the tariﬀ z on the vertical axis and the mass of traders N on the horizontal
20axis. The line FF depicts combinations of z and N that are consistent with








Since PD (N,z) is decreasing in N and increasing in z, the FF line has
to be upward sloping as depicted: an increase in z (for a given N)r a i s e s
the price paid by consumers and reduces imports while an increase in N (for
ag i v e nz) lowers the price paid by consumers and increases imports, so an
increase in z m u s tb ea c c o m p a n i e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nN in order to keep
imports constant along FF.B yd e ﬁnition, FF intersects the horizontal axis






Similarly, the upward sloping line QQ depicts combinations of z and N






= ¯ Q. (18)
As the quota is set below the free trade level of imports, the QQ line
m u s tl i ea b o v ea n dt ot h el e f to fFF. Moreover, its intersection with the
horizontal axis occurs at N0
¡ ¯ Q
¢
, the level of entry in the absence of tariﬀs
that makes the quota just binding.
Likewise, the upward sloping line ZZ depicts combinations of z and N
that are consistent with the free entry equilibrium output level under the







z (¯ z) (19)
where Qz (¯ z)=QD ¡
PD (Nz (¯ z), ¯ z)
¢
. Since we know that Qz (¯ z) is less than
¯ Q, the ZZ line must lie above and to the left of QQ.
The fourth component of the diagram is the free entry line, EE.T h e
line EE depicts combinations of z and N such that the quasi rent per trader
exactly oﬀsets the cost of entry:
r
z(N,z)=fe. (20)
As noted earlier, rz (N,z) is decreasing in both arguments. Hence the
EE line must slope downwards as depicted in Figure 5.A l s o ,t h e EE line
must cut the horizontal axis at N = NF since that point represents the free
trade equilibrium.

































22The intersection of the QQ line and the EE l i n eg i v e st h ef r e ee n t r y
equilibrium with a quota of ¯ Q (when the quota licenses are sold). This
occurs at point B on the line EE,w h e r ez and N a r es u c ht h a tt h ef r e e
entry condition is met and imports are equal to ¯ Q .A tp o i n tB, z is exactly






due to tariﬀ quota equivalence.
Since the EE line is downward sloping, N0
¡ ¯ Q
¢
<N Q ¡ ¯ Q
¢
<N F as was
shown earlier.
Proposition 5 Equilibrium entry under the quota (when licenses are sold)
is higher than under a speciﬁct a r i ﬀ that is initially import equivalent to the
quota at N>N Q¡ ¯ Q
¢
. If equivalence is deﬁned at N<N Q¡ ¯ Q
¢
,t h e nt h e
opposite holds.
Proof. We can use Figure 5 to depict the import equivalent speciﬁct a r i ﬀ at
any initial N. For example, suppose we start at N = NF.F r o mNF on the
horizontal axis, go up to the QQ curve to point A: the vertical distance gives
the level of z needed to get imports of ¯ Q. This is what we had denoted by
¯ z in the previous subsection. Set the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ at this level and ﬁnd the
number of traders that enter using the EE line: point C on the EE line will
give the equilibrium entry, Nz (¯ z), with this tariﬀ. It is clear from Figure 5
that Nz (¯ z) <N Q¡ ¯ Q
¢
<N F.17
To generalize, suppose that we start at some arbitrary N = ˜ N. Following
the same procedure as above, we can determine the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ equivalent
to the quota ¯ Q b yg o i n gu pt ot h eQQ line in Figure 5: the vertical distance
gives z
³
˜ N, ¯ Q
´
. The free entry level of traders at this tariﬀ–call it ˜ Nz–is
obtained by going across to the EE line at z = z
³
˜ N, ¯ Q
´
.I f˜ N>N Q ¡ ¯ Q
¢
,
then ˜ Nz <N Q ¡ ¯ Q
¢
and equilibrium welfare under the tariﬀ is higher than






If ˜ N<N Q¡ ¯ Q
¢
,t h e n ˜ Nz >N Q¡ ¯ Q
¢
and equilibrium welfare under the tariﬀ
is higher than WQ¡




.19 Basically, the smaller is ˜ N,t h es m a l l e r
w i l lb et h ei m p o r te q u i v a l e n ts p e c i ﬁct a r i ﬀ and the closer the equilibrium
17Since Nq ¡ ¯ Q
¢
>N Q ¡ ¯ Q
¢
, we can say that entry under the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ is lower
than entry under the (initially) import-equivalent quota, no matter how the licenses are
distributed.
18Equilibrium welfare under the quota remains at WQ ¡





19If ˜ N = NQ ¡ ¯ Q
¢
,t h e n ˜ Nz = NQ ¡ ¯ Q
¢
, i.e. if we start start at NQ ¡ ¯ Q
¢
and impose
an import equivalent speciﬁct a r i ﬀ, there wil be no change in N.I f˜ N = N0
¡ ¯ Q
¢
,t h e n
23level of entry will be to the free trade equilibrium, NF, so that there is less of
a distortion under the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ than under the quota when the licenses
are sold.
This result argues for caution when tariﬀying quotas as a means to lib-
eralize trade. A common strategy to convert quotas to tariﬀsi sf o rt h e
government to auction the quota rights and use the realized license prices
as guides to setting tariﬀs. Proposition 5 shows that in computing the tar-







;at a r i ﬀ equivalent calculated at any other level of N will not
be equivalent and hence may not have the desired result. In addition, the al-
location of quota licenses needs to be considered in deﬁning the “equivalent”
speciﬁct a r i ﬀ. Recall that both entry and the implicit license price are higher
when the quota licenses are given to the traders than when they are sold. In
Figure 5, the “free” quota equilibrium is on the QQ line, northeast of point
B (and possibly northeast of point A). It is easy to see that tariﬀying the
quota at Nq ¡ ¯ Q
¢
rather than at NQ ¡ ¯ Q
¢
would lead to a net exit of traders.
Proposition 6 Equilibrium welfare under the quota (when licenses are sold)
is higher than under a speciﬁct a r i ﬀ that is initially import equivalent to the
quota at N>N Q¡ ¯ Q
¢
. If equivalence is deﬁned at N<N Q¡ ¯ Q
¢
,t h e nt h e
opposite holds.
Proof. Since welfare is maximized with respect to N for a given ¯ Q at N =
NQ¡ ¯ Q
¢






must be tangent to the QQ line at point B. This is depicted








welfare is increasing in ¯ Q, from Lemma 3). Therefore, the iso-welfare contour
corresponding to WQ¡




must lie outside that corresponding to
free trade, where welfare is maximized at point NF on the horizontal axis.
If we start at NQ¡ ¯ Q
¢
and impose an import equivalent speciﬁct a r i ﬀ,






if equivalence is deﬁned at N = NF, then equilibrium welfare with the speciﬁc
tariﬀ (at point C)i se q u a lt oWz (Nz (¯ z), ¯ z).N o t e t h a t¯ z (represented by







(represented by the height of point B). Since NZ(¯ z)
is less than NQ¡ ¯ Q
¢
, it follows that the quota that is import-equivalent to
˜ Nz = NF:i fw es t a r ts t a r ta tN0
¡ ¯ Q
¢




, then the import equivalent speciﬁct a r i ﬀ becomes a subsidy, and ˜ Nz >N F.
24¯ z at N = Nz (¯ z) h a st ob es m a l l e rt h a n ¯ Q.F r o m L e m m a 3 , w e k n o w









By an analogous argument, it can be shown that equilibrium welfare
under the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ is higher than under the equivalent quota (when
licenses are sold) when equivalence is deﬁned at N<N Q¡ ¯ Q
¢
. 20
How does equilibrium welfare under the “free” quota compare with wel-
fare under the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ? In general we cannot say, since in Figure 5,t h e
iso-welfare contour that goes through the “free” quota equilibrium which lies
to the right of B along QQ,c a nb ea b o v eo rb e l o wWz (Nz (¯ z), ¯ z) .
6 Restricted Trade: Ad Valorem Tariﬀs
Now let us once again return to the free trade equilibrium and impose an ad
















Since we assume a single price for the good in the domestic market, and
the ad valorem tariﬀ is levied on the domestic market price, all traders will
pay the same tariﬀ amount in dollar terms (as with the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ earlier).
Thus, the ad valorem tariﬀ equals the import equivalent speciﬁct a r i ﬀ at
N = NF in nominal terms. However, as the ad valorem rate is ﬁxed, the
total payment depends on the supply price in the market, which of course,
depends on the mass of traders entering the market–as more traders enter,
the supply price drops and as a result, the dollar amount of the tariﬀ also
drops. Thus, an ad valorem tariﬀ is like a speciﬁct a r i ﬀ that declines with N.
More formally, for any N,g i v e n¯ t, pre-tariﬀ supply is NF(P) and post-tariﬀ
supply is NF (P/(1 + ¯ t)). Hence, the equilibrium demand price is given by












20B u tf r e et r a d ew e l f a r ei ss t i l lt h eh i g h e s t .
25Note that PD (N,¯ t) is decreasing in N and increasing in ¯ t. The supply
price of the marginal trader is PS (N,¯ t)=PD (N,¯ t)/(1 + ¯ t);PS (N,¯ t) is de-
creasing in both arguments.21 Each trader pays a tariﬀ amount of ¯ tPS (N,¯ t).
Denote this by T (N,¯ t). As N rises, PS (N,¯ t) falls, so T (N,¯ t) falls. In this
way, the ad valorem tariﬀ is like a speciﬁct a r i ﬀ that falls as N rises.






Since PS (N,¯ t) is decreasing in both arguments, so is rt (N,¯ t).
Lemma 8 rt (N,¯ t) lies below rz(N,¯ z) for N<N F and above rz(N,¯ z) for
N>N F.
Proof. At N = NF, the ad valorem tariﬀ is equivalent, in nominal terms, to










and as a result, rt(NF,¯ t)=rz(NF, ¯ z).W h e n N increases beyond NF,
T (N,¯ t) falls but ¯ z remains ﬁxed, so T (N,¯ t) < ¯ z,hence PS (N,¯ t) >P S (N,¯ z)
and rt(NF,¯ t) >r z(NF, ¯ z). Similarly, when N<N F, T (N,¯ t) > ¯ z so
PS (N,¯ t) <P S (N,¯ z) and rt(N,¯ t) <r z(N,¯ z).
The quasi rent function under the ad valorem tariﬀ, rt(N,¯ t), is depicted
in Figure 4 by the dashed curve. Equilibrium entry under the ad valorem
tariﬀ, which we will denote by Nt (¯ t), is determined by the intersection of
rt(N,¯ t) and fe. Note that Nt (¯ t) is decreasing in ¯ t. Furthermore, it follows
from the same argument as Lemma 1 that the equilibrium supply price is
the same as the free trade price: PS (Nt (¯ t),¯ t)=PF ¡
NF¢
.
Proposition 7 If we start at the free trade equilibrium and impose an ad
valorem tariﬀ that is initially import equivalent to the quota ¯ Q and the speciﬁc
tariﬀ ¯ z, there will be a net exit of traders over time and the new equilibrium
will be characterized by a lower level of entry compared with the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ.
Average cost will ﬁrst fall and then rise (average productivity will ﬁrst rise
and then fall) as traders change their import and entry decisions in response
to the tariﬀ. Imports will fall over time as the number of traders shrinks. In






(1 + ¯ t)PS (N,¯ t)
¢
and partially diﬀerentiating it with respect to N and ¯ t.
26the new equilibrium, average cost (productivity) will return to its free trade
level, but the nominal tariﬀ will be higher than ¯ z and imports will be less than
what they were under the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ.
Proof. If we start at the free trade equilibrium and impose an ad valorem
tariﬀ ¯ t, t h ei m p a c te ﬀect will be to make it unproﬁtable for incumbent traders





to import. As in the







. Hence average cost falls (average productivity rises).
Over time, there will be a net exit of traders from the market, exactly
with the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ.H o w e v e r ,a s N falls, the supply price rises and the
nominal tariﬀ, T (N,¯ t), rises.
In the new equilibrium, the mass of traders is smaller than that under
the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ:L e m m a8 implies that the intersection of fe with rt(N,¯ t),
which determines the equilibrium mass of traders, Nt (¯ t),m u s to c c u rb e l o w
Nz (¯ z) as depicted in Figure 4. Hence, Nt (¯ t) <N z (¯ z) <N Q ¡ ¯ Q
¢
<N q ¡ ¯ Q
¢
.
As in the case of the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ, entry could even drop to zero if ¯ t is
high enough (reﬂecting a very restrictive quota). In the new equilibrium, the
supply price returns to PF ¡
NF¢
, so average cost and productivity return to
their free trade levels. However, the nominal tariﬀ is greater than ¯ z so the
demand price (which is the supply price plus the nominal tariﬀ)i sh i g h e r
than it was under the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ, and consequently, equilibrium imports
are lower than they were under the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ.
For any N and ¯ t, welfare is the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus,
















Lemma 9 ∂Wt (N,¯ t)/∂t > 0 at N = Nt (¯ t). In other words, the ad valorem
tariﬀ results in a level of entry that is sub-optimally low, given the tariﬀ rate.
Proof. In the Appendix.
In equilibrium (when N = Nt (¯ t)), all quasi rents are competed away so




















t (¯ t),¯ t
¢¢
(25)
Proposition 8 Equilibrium welfare under the ad valorem tariﬀ is lower than
under a speciﬁct a r i ﬀ that is initially import equivalent at N = NF.
Proof. From Lemma 6, welfare under a speciﬁct a r i ﬀ is decreasing in ¯ z and
increasing in N at N ≤ Nz (¯ z). Since the equilibrium ad valorem tariﬀ has
the same eﬀect as a speciﬁct a r i ﬀ that is larger than ¯ z with a smaller mass of
traders (N<N z (¯ z)), it follows that free entry welfare under the ad valorem
tariﬀ must be smaller than free entry welfare under the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ. Hence:
Wt (Nt (¯ t),¯ t) <W z (Nz (¯ z), ¯ z). This can be seen in Figure 5 where points
to the northwest of point C (representing combinations of z and N where
z>¯ z and N<N z (¯ z)) lie outside the iso-welfare contour corresponding to
the equilibrium under the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ, ¯ z.
7C o n c l u s i o n
The eﬀects of trade policy can be very sensitive to the choice of instruments
once we allow for the role of traders. This is true even in the absence of imper-
fect competition and product diﬀerentiation. When imports are facilitated
by competitive traders who are identical ex ante but heterogeneous ex post,
the entry and welfare eﬀects of tariﬀs and quotas diﬀer considerably: speciﬁc
tariﬀs tend to reduce entry and welfare more than import equivalent quotas,
a n da dv a l o r e mt a r i ﬀs reduce entry and welfare even further. The intuition
behind our results is simple. Although tariﬀs and quotas are equivalent given
entry, their eﬀects on entry are profoundly diﬀerent. Trade restrictions by
and large discourage entry and thereby reduce the supply of imports. But
quotas tend to discourage entry less than tariﬀsd o . T h er e a s o ni st h a ta s
traders leave the market in response to the quota, import supply shrinks–
this reduces the value of a quota licensea n dh e n c et h er e s t r i c t i v e n e s so ft h e
quota. By contrast, the exit of traders does not change the restrictiveness of
a given speciﬁct a r i ﬀ.
28Our results ﬂy in the face of the conventional preference for tariﬀso v e r
quotas. However, the comparison is more nuanced when we consider how
the quota is implemented. In most cases, quota licenses are not sold by the
government–auction quotas are relatively rare–but given to the traders
free of charge on the basis of certain criteria, such as historical import per-
formance, or the level of investment, or even ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-served. Welfare
under such a “free” quota may well be lower than welfare under an initially
import equivalent tariﬀ, even though entry is greater. In fact, the most
common criticism of quotas is their potential for encouraging rent-seeking
behavior. “Free” quota allocation schemes give traders the incentive to ex-
pend real resources on things like opening an oﬃce in the capital city in order
to be close to the license administrator–such expenditures provide no utility
to either party and thus represent pure waste. If these expenditures are large,
then welfare under a “free” quota will be even lower than our model suggests,
and more likely to fall below that associated with an initially import equiv-
alent tariﬀ. In sum, it is the method of quota allocation that matters–an
auction quota is preferable to an (initially) import equivalent tariﬀ,b u ta
“free” quota, which tends to promote wasteful rent-seeking behavior, need
not be preferable to a tariﬀ.
A widely promoted tenet of trade policy reform is to replace quotas with
“equivalent” tariﬀs which can then be lowered in a transparent manner. (See,
for example, Thomas, Nash, and associates (1991) and WTO (2005).) But
ﬁnding the correct “equivalent” tariﬀ (whether speciﬁco ra dv a l o r e m )f o r
a given quota depends crucially on the details of the quota arrangement in
place. If the quota licenses are given rather than sold to traders, as is often
the case, then a large number of traders will enter the market and the value
of a quota license will be high in equilibrium. Tariﬀying such a “free” quota
will result in an excessively high tariﬀ that will shrink the import market
excessively and could lead to a reduction in welfare. The results are worse if
t h ec o n v e r s i o ni st oa na dv a l o r e mt a r i ﬀ instead of a speciﬁct a r i ﬀ.22
Our model also provides an alternative insight into the implications of
corruption. After all, trade policy in the form of a tariﬀ or quota is only one
way in which traders can be “penalized” by giving up part of what their ef-
forts obtain. Corruption in the domestic economy could transfer quasi rents
and/or raise traders’ costs in a very similar manner. In our model, welfare
under a quota is actually higher, and entry lower, when quota rents are not
22Moschini (1991) discusses other pitfalls in tariﬃcation.
29appropriated by the traders but by some other domestic agent, including,
possibly, corrupt government agents (assuming, of course, that the welfare
of this group is also counted as part of social welfare). A quota lowers so-
cial welfare relative to free trade due to the output distortion it introduces.
When the quota licenses are sold, entry will adjust to its welfare-maximizing
level under the quota but when quota licenses are given to the traders, there
is an entry distortion on top of the output distortion. For this reason, cor-
ruption that transfers license rents from the traders to other domestic agents
may improve social welfare. On the other hand, if we interpret corruption
as allowing those with power to extract a ﬁxed fee from all traders, then
corruption is equivalent to a speciﬁc tax, with similar eﬀects.
30Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .
dW F (N)
dN












































The ﬁrst equality above comes diﬀerentiating; the second from rearranging
terms; and the third from (i) market clearing–demand equals supply at price
PF(NF) so that the ﬁr s ts q u a r eb r a c k e t e dt e r mi sz e r o ,a n d( i i )t h ef r e ee n t r y
condition–at N = NF, the expected level of proﬁts exactly covers ﬁxed cost
so that the second square bracketed term is zero.
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The ﬁrst equality comes from diﬀerentiation; the second from rearranging
terms; and the third from (i) market clearing–supply at Ps ¡




31equals the quota level, so that the ﬁrst square-bracketed term is zero, and
(ii) the free entry condition–at N = NQ ¡ ¯ Q
¢
, the expected level of proﬁts
exactly covers ﬁxed cost so that the second square bracketed term is zero.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 . Diﬀerentiating Equation (9) with respect to ¯ Q :
dWQ ¡






















D0 ¡ ¯ Q
¢ ¯ Q − ¯ Q
dP S ¡









































where the ﬁrst equality comes from total diﬀerentiation; the second from
rearranging terms; and the third from (i) market clearing–demand at PD( ¯ Q)
equals the quota level, so that the second square-bracketed term is zero, and
(ii) Lemma 1. The inequality follows from the result that the license price is
positive in equilibrium (Proposition 2).
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 . The ﬁrst result in the lemma follows from diﬀerenti-








































































32where the ﬁrst equality comes from total diﬀerentiation; the second from
rearranging terms; and the third from market clearing–supply at PS ¡
N, ¯ Q
¢
equals the quota level, so that the ﬁrst square-bracketed term is zero.
The second result in the lemma follows from diﬀerentiating Equation (10)



























































































D0 ¡ ¯ Q
¢
where the ﬁrst equality comes from total diﬀerentiation; the second from
rearranging terms; and the third from market clearing–supply at PS ¡
N, ¯ Q
¢
equals the quota level, so that the ﬁrst square-bracketed term is zero. We









≥ 0.W h e n¯ Q is at (close





P r o o fo fL e m m a6 . The ﬁrst result in the lemma follows from diﬀerenti-
















































¢ ∂PD (N,¯ z)
∂¯ z
< 0
where the ﬁrst equality comes from diﬀerentiation; the second from rearrang-
i n gt e r m s ,u s i n gt h ef a c tt h a tPS (N,¯ z)=PD (N,¯ z)− ¯ z so ∂PS (N,¯ z)/∂¯ z = ¡
∂PD (N,¯ z)/∂¯ z
¢
− 1; and the third from market clearing (Equation (13)




< 0 and ∂PD (N,¯ z)/∂¯ z>0.
The second result in the lemma follows from diﬀerentiating Equation (15)



































































¢ ∂PD (N,¯ z)
∂N
.
The ﬁrst equality comes from diﬀerentiation; the second from rearranging
terms, using the fact that ∂PS (N,¯ z)/∂N = ∂PD (N,¯ z)/∂N;a n dt h et h i r d
from market clearing (Equation (13).
At N = Nz (¯ z), the free entry condition ensures that the expected level
of proﬁts exactly covers ﬁxed cost so that
PS(Nz(¯ z),¯ z) Z
0
F (c)dc − fe =0 .T h u s
we are left with:
∂Wz(N,¯ z)
∂N












< 0 and ∂PD (N,¯ z)/∂N < 0.
At N<N z (¯ z),P S(N,¯ z) >P S(Nz (¯ z), ¯ z) so
PS(N,¯ z) Z
0
F (c)dc−fe > 0 and
∂Wz(N,¯ z)/∂N > 0.
35P r o o fo fL e m m a7 . Diﬀerentiating Equation (16) with respect to ¯ z :





z (¯ z), ¯ z))












z (¯ z), ¯ z)






z (¯ z), ¯ z)
¢ dP D(Nz (¯ z), ¯ z)
d¯ z
< 0
where the ﬁrst equality comes from total diﬀerentiation and the second from
the fact that PD(Nz (¯ z), ¯ z)=PS(Nz (¯ z), ¯ z)+¯ z and dP S(Nz (¯ z), ¯ z)/d¯ z =0 ,
so dPD(Nz (¯ z), ¯ z)/d¯ z =1 . The inequality follows from QD0 ¡




P r o o fo fL e m m a9 . Diﬀerentiating Equation (24) with respect to N for
ag i v e n¯ t :
∂Wt (N,¯ t)
∂N





































































36where the ﬁrst equality comes from total diﬀerentiation, using the fact that
T (N,¯ t)=¯ tPS(N,¯ t); the second from rearranging terms, using the fact that
PD(N,¯ t)=( 1+¯ t)PS(N,¯ t);a n dt h et h i r df r o m( i )m a r k e tc l e a r i n g( E q u a t i o n
(22) so that the ﬁrst square-bracketed term is zero, and (ii) the free entry
condition (Equation (23) so that the second square-bracketed term is zero.
The inequality follows from QD0 ¡
PD(N,¯ t)
¢
< 0 and ∂PD(N,¯ t)/∂N < 0.
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